PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang has firmly pushed back against suggestions that his Islamic party bears responsibility for making Perikatan Nasional (PN) toxic, instead laying blame squarely on Bersatu and its leadership for the coalition's internal strife. His remarks come amid ongoing tensions within the right-wing political alliance that has fractured significantly over the past two years, leaving the bloc's national ambitions in disarray.
The PAS leadership's latest defence reflects a broader pattern of inter-party finger-pointing within PN, a coalition formed in 2020 that once positioned itself as an alternative to both Pakatan Harapan and UMNO-led Barisan Nasional. What began as an ideological alliance between the Islamist PAS, Muhyiddin Yassin's Bersatu, and smaller conservative parties has unravelled into a dysfunctional partnership marked by competing ambitions, strategic miscalculations, and personality clashes at the top levels.
Hadi's deflection strategy appears designed to protect PAS's political standing as the coalition deteriorates. The party has built considerable influence within PN, leveraging its grassroots organisation and control of several states—particularly in the northern and eastern regions—to maintain relevance in Malaysian politics. By attributing coalition dysfunction to external factors rather than internal shortcomings, PAS seeks to preserve its credibility with allies and supporters who might otherwise question its commitment to collective political projects.
The tensions between PAS and Bersatu have become increasingly public, with each party accusing the other of breaching coalition agreements and prioritising narrow factional interests over collective goals. Bersatu's conduct within the alliance, according to Hadi's account, has ranged from alleged strategic miscalculations to decisions perceived as unilaterally damaging to PN's broader political position. These grievances extend beyond personality disputes to substantive disagreements about coalition strategy, particularly regarding positioning towards other political blocs and electoral calculations.
Muhyiddin's Bersatu, once seen as the coalition's centrepiece given his former prime ministerial credentials, has struggled to maintain internal cohesion and external credibility. The party's declining membership, loss of parliamentary seats during recent political realignments, and factional disputes have undermined its capacity to serve as an effective coalition anchor. Meanwhile, PAS has capitalised on this weakness to consolidate influence within PN, though the strategy risks making the larger party appear self-interested rather than genuinely committed to coalition interests.
For Malaysian politics more broadly, the PN implosion reflects deeper systemic challenges within the country's coalition-based parliamentary system. Alliances formed on narrow, often temporary grounds frequently collapse when constituent parties face conflicting incentives—whether electoral survival, ideological consistency, or leadership succession. PN's case demonstrates how quickly such arrangements can become liabilities rather than assets, particularly when larger structural changes occur in the political landscape.
The coalition's dysfunction also creates opportunities for opponents. Pakatan Harapan and BN have both sought to exploit PN's internal divisions, attempting to peel away dissatisfied members or coalition partners who might find alternative political homes more advantageous. Some observers speculate that certain PN figures may eventually migrate to other blocs if the coalition's rehabilitation appears impossible, further fragmenting the anti-establishment right-wing space.
Regionally, PN's weakness has implications for Southeast Asian politics. The coalition once represented a pan-Malay Muslim political force that extended influence into Brunei and had informal connections with similarly-oriented movements across the region. Its decline reflects broader questions about whether identity-based conservative coalitions can sustain themselves without delivering material benefits or achieving significant political victories. The lesson may be instructive for similar alliances elsewhere in the region.
For PAS specifically, the present situation offers both risks and opportunities. The party can pursue a strategy of reconstructing PN under different terms, potentially with greater influence over decision-making. Alternatively, if PN collapse seems irreversible, PAS has preserved sufficient political standing to negotiate with other blocs or maintain an independent power base, particularly in states where it holds administrative control. Hadi's rhetoric suggests the party is keeping multiple options open while maintaining a posture of injured innocence regarding coalition dysfunction.
The timing of Hadi's comments, made amid ongoing discussions about PN's future direction, signals that PAS continues processing the coalition's deterioration while positioning itself as a reliable political force despite the broader instability. Whether this defensive approach can successfully rehabilitate PN or whether it merely prolongs an ultimately terminal decline remains uncertain, but the trajectory of recent years suggests structural solutions may elude the coalition's leadership.
Moving forward, Malaysian political observers will watch whether Hadi's party can rebuild trust with Bersatu and other PN components, or whether the coalition dissolves further into its constituent parts. The outcome will shape not only the right-wing political landscape but also the broader competitive dynamics between Malaysia's major political blocs in preparation for the next general election.
