The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) has issued a stark warning about the implications of artificial intelligence for regional financial independence, contending that without deliberate policy coordination, the bloc's ten member states plus China, Japan and South Korea risk deepening their structural dependence on the US dollar. In a Thursday commentary, AMRO economists articulated how decisions made by major AI firms, cloud service providers and multinational payment networks are quietly architecting a fresh monetary order in which dollar-denominated transactions become increasingly unavoidable—a dynamic that could lock Southeast Asian nations, the Philippines, Thailand and their peers into subordinate economic roles in the digital age.
The core concern outlined by AMRO reflects a subtle but profound shift in how global commerce operates. As artificial intelligence becomes embedded across supply chains, business operations and consumer transactions, the companies controlling these AI systems and the infrastructure they run on have effectively become gatekeepers of monetary flows. Cloud providers hosting computational resources, payment networks processing machine-to-machine transactions, and AI platforms executing commercial decisions all favour dollar-based settlement because of network effects and established relationships with Western financial institutions. This creates what AMRO describes as a self-reinforcing cycle: once dollar dependency becomes entrenched through AI systems, reversing course becomes exponentially more difficult.
For ASEAN+3 nations, the implications are particularly acute. Many regional economies already depend on dollar-denominated imports, foreign direct investment and external financing. An AI-driven monetary ecosystem centred on the dollar would compound these vulnerabilities, reducing policy autonomy and exposing smaller economies to currency fluctuations beyond their control. More fundamentally, it would erode the capacity of governments to regulate financial flows and implement counter-cyclical economic policies during crises—a lesson the region learned painfully during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. The threat is not merely economic but geopolitical, as currency dominance correlates with broader structural power in global affairs.
AMRO's recommendation eschews futile attempts to block dollar integration and instead proposes a pragmatic three-pillar strategy combining energy, artificial intelligence and payments. The think tank argues that ASEAN+3 economies should collectively expand data centre capacity across the region, powered by renewable and affordable energy sources increasingly available through solar, wind and hydroelectric projects already underway in countries like Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. By controlling their own computational infrastructure rather than relying on foreign cloud providers, regional firms and governments would gain independence over where and how data is processed—a foundational requirement for true digital sovereignty.
The energy dimension of this proposal deserves particular emphasis for Malaysian readers. Southeast Asia possesses substantial renewable energy potential, yet much of it remains underdeveloped due to capital constraints and fragmented regulatory frameworks. A coordinated ASEAN+3 energy strategy could unlock billions in investment while simultaneously serving the computational needs of a regional AI ecosystem. Malaysia's position as an advanced economy with manufacturing capabilities positions it to become a hub for data centre development and green energy infrastructure, creating high-value employment and attracting technology firms seeking alternatives to American cloud monopolies.
The payments pillar represents perhaps the most immediately actionable component. AMRO advocates for developing local-currency tokenized payment systems—digital versions of rupiah, ringgit, baht and other regional currencies that can be used for international transactions without converting to dollars. Such systems, built on distributed ledger technology or other decentralized frameworks, could support what the commentary calls "agentic commerce," referring to automated transactions between artificial intelligence systems and human actors or between multiple AI agents. By creating payment rails that operate in regional currencies, ASEAN+3 economies would enable businesses to participate in advanced digital commerce without surrendering to dollar-based financial infrastructure.
The proposal also addresses regulatory concerns that have constrained regional payment innovation. By developing coordinated local-currency payment systems, governments and central banks retain visibility and oversight of cross-border transactions in ways that private cryptocurrency networks do not permit. This preserves the essential supervisory functions required to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and financial instability while simultaneously liberating commercial activity from dollar dependence. The distinction matters: regional policymakers can craft digital payment systems that are both decentralized in operation and subject to transparent regulatory governance.
Implementing AMRO's three-pillar strategy would require unprecedented coordination among ASEAN+3 governments, central banks and private sector actors. Regulatory harmonization across thirteen distinct jurisdictions presents formidable obstacles, particularly given divergent development levels and competing national interests. China's Belt and Road Initiative and Japan's economic influence would shape how projects are financed and governed. Yet the alternative—passive acceptance of dollar-driven AI infrastructure—essentially forecloses regional agency in one of humanity's most consequential technological transitions. The choice between coordination costs now and monetary subordination later is fundamentally a choice about the region's future role in the global economy.
For Malaysian policymakers, the timing of AMRO's intervention aligns with broader regional reassessments of technology policy and financial architecture. Southeast Asia has become a battleground for competing visions of digital governance, with the United States promoting interoperable open standards while China advances alternative platforms and payment systems. Neither approach perfectly serves regional interests. A genuinely regionalist strategy—coordinated among ASEAN+3 partners—offers the possibility of development pathways that privilege neither American nor Chinese interests but instead serve the collective advancement of participating economies.
The practical implications extend to corporate investment and workforce development. Universities and technical institutes across the region would need to expand their artificial intelligence and renewable energy curricula substantially. Infrastructure financing through development banks, particularly the Asian Development Bank and regional institutions, would require reorientation toward data centre construction and energy grid modernization. Private technology firms would need incentives to participate in regional payment and AI systems rather than defaulting to imported American solutions. These shifts represent not merely technical adjustments but a fundamental reorientation of how the region approaches digital transformation.
AMRO's analysis ultimately rests on a sophisticated understanding of how technological change interacts with economic power. Artificial intelligence is not itself inherently dollar-dependent—it is the commercial ecosystem surrounding AI development and deployment that channels activity through American payment networks and cloud providers. By reconstructing that ecosystem at the regional level, ASEAN+3 economies could harness AI's productive potential while insulating themselves from monetary subordination. Whether the region's governments possess the political will for such ambitious coordination remains the critical unanswered question.
